We prnp)sc a blind image watennarking algorithm that has three mahi features: ( I ) il satisfies an undckx%thility cow straint with rcspect to a statistical image model. (2) it rcjccts host-signal interference. aid ( 3 ) it is robust against ndditive ;uid multiplicative iioise. filtering. cropping. and r m dom hcnding.
1NTKOI)UCTION
In some applications. it is desired to secretly embed inlormation into cover data. in such a way that the presence of embedded information is undetectable, Such is the case in steganography, where a sender wishes to secretly transmit data to a receiver [I] . It is often assumed that thc stego data (output of the steganogrdphic code) are received without transmission errors (the so-called passive warden scenario).
Another type of application, which is explored in this paper, is digital signature verification with the additional requiremcnt that embedding-of the digital signature into the host data he undetectable by the general public (by eavesdroppers). This property of the verification system could he uscful in applications such as security applications. If signature embedding is statistically visible, then appropriate attacks can he often designed to remove the signature. -' monitoring systems in which the document owner wishes to discretely verify the trustworthiness of users. e copyright protection systems in which the document owner does not wish to publicly announce that he is protecting some documenls. hccausc of sensitive coinincrcial or political issues.
other forensic watermarking systcrns
The differellcc hctween the above applicalions and passivewxdco steganography is that ( I ) pcrhaps as little as one hit ol information is tn he bidden (because the receiver knows the digital sigiiature to he verified), and (2) thc system should he designcd so that reliable verification is possible even when the marked data are degraded (attacked).
While there has been considerable literature on robust, blind image watermarking in the last ten years, the best methods (those that reject host-signal interference at the detector) do not satisfy ai undetectability condition. This is true of most QIM (quantization index modulation) watermarking systems. Two recently developed stochatic QIM systems [4] satisfy an undetectahility condition, and this paper explores the possibility of making such systems robust against signal-dependent noise and geometric attacks. 
Its power spectrum is
Let &:(A:) be agoodestimator ofmf(k). Define the nonnalized periodogram.
Also define a DFT phase sequence & ( k ) such th;it
Statistical Model: ,i,(k) are i.i.d. random vxiables with unit exponential distribution: pu(ir) = e-'' for IL 2 0. The power spectrum S(k) is assumed to be slowly varying.
Under the above assuinption. the power spectrum cui be reliably estimated from data by lowpass filtering the penodogmin. so we have &z.(k) = &k). The model above is motivated by spectral theory for wide-sense stationary raw dom processes [7] .
To illustrate the validity of the above model for ~( k : ) , we computed the histogram of .ti(k) for Lrna, as shown in Cropping. In the frequency dornai~i. the elkcl of cropping is to convolve S ( k ) with the 2-D DFf of the window iunction used for cropping.
Warping (or raidom bending). This causes a frequcncydependent spread of DFT components. which is benign at low liequencics but severe at high frequencies.
EMREDDING MODKL #1
First consider a marking rnodel that is resistant against noise and linear filtering attacks but not against strong cropping
Given the host signal s. compute the normalized peri- The marked signal is defined a
The set IC* is the secret shared between the embedder and detector. The embedding distortion is an increasing function of E.
Obselve that the marking scheme satisfies a steganographic constraint in the sense that according to our model z, the pdfs of S and X (averaged with respect to IC') are 'More wwk Is needed to see how well this made1 holds in practice.
identical. (Of course the pdf of S coiiditioned on X' is markedly different from ps.) From the attacker's perspective. reliably estimating the secret X* is straightforward when c = 1 (the attacker would easily defeat our scheme in this case) but b e c "~ impossible when c -0.
DETECTION
We have two hypotheses: II, (unmarked signal Y) aid Hi (marked signal I"). The 
No Atlacks
Io the absence of attacks (I" = S). the rival pdfs of .IL)I can he derived exactly:
. . The points in the range 0 < Ppa < e-lKlh(f) are achieved using a randomized LRT.
Remark. The ROC is independent of the energy of the host image. It depends only on the product of 1x1 and h(e).
Attacks
Motivated by the analysis i n the previous subsection, we use Observe that NjIIBLC1, is a sufficient statistic [8] for detection U i the ahseuce of attacks. Moreover. N,,,;,,,I , is a h " invariant to liltcriiig altach.
3 . Numerical Resulls
We applied the detector 
EMBEDDING MODEL #Z
The making model iieeds to be modified in order to cope with strong cropping or warping attacks. Cropping results in blurring in the frequency domain. Warping causes frequencydependent spread hi the frequency domain. Let ICj denote a neighborhood of L frequencies around frequency kj. Define 
A marking process similar to that described in Sec. 3 is applied to {~( j ) } , resulting in marked coefficients { G ( j j } that have the same pdf (averaged over 9') as the original pdf. Next let C ( k ) = g u ( k ) for all k E Kj, j E 5. and The test is (9), with test statistic now given by N,,,,,,, = I9mmatcht.where9m,,,,I, = { j E 9' : w(j) 2 ut}u{j E 9 \ 9' : W ( j ) < vi).
We tested this detector using the following degraded images: a cropped version of Lena, in which only the 156 x 156 center pan of her face is retained. a heavily warpcd, diffnrined version of Leno (see Fig. 4 ). The warping field was a 2-D AR( I) Gaussian process. The maximal pixel deviation for typical realizations of this process was 15.
Fig. 4. Warped Leno
Applying the test (9) to cropped and warped versions of ,!.elm aid using k,,,i,, = 40, A.,,,,, = 220, e = 1 .
25 {A:. 1 . J ,. E L = 5, we have obtained no errors in the cropping case aid enor probabilities lower than 10% in the case of severe warping.
-J } = { 4 0 , 6 0 ,~. . , 2 2 0 } 2 , { k j , j t~} = {80,1XO}'and
